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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW REQUIRED FOR CONVICTION UNDER CRIMINAL REGISTRATION ORDINANCE-Defendant-appellant was charged with violation of a Los Angeles municipal
ordinance which required all persons convicted of a felony in California,
or of a crime committed elsewhere which would have been punishable as
a felony in California, subsequent to January I, 1921, to register with the
Chief of Police upon remaining in the city longer than five days, or upon
making more than five visits to the city within a thirty-day period. At the
time of her arrest, appellant had been a resident of Los Angeles for seven
years. Within that period she had been convicted (in Los Angeles) of forgery,
a felony in California, and had subsequently failed to register as required.
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At her jury trial appellant asserted that the application of the ordinance to
her was a denial of due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, but was convicted, fined
$250, and placed on probation for three years. Her motion for arrest of
judgment and new trial was denied and the judgment affirmed on appeal
by the Appellate Department of the Superior Court. On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, held, reversed, four justices dissenting.1 In
the absence of actual knowledge or proof of facts sufficient to establish
probable knowledge of the duty imposed by the ordinance, the conviction
of appellant violated the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
The police power has long been recognized as one of the least !imitable
of those exercisable by local government.2 Nevertheless, a long line of
Supreme Court decisions has imposed the vague language of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a limitation on that power, requiring that it not be exercised in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious
manner.3 The general tests for validity which have evolved from the cases
suggest that the legislation must concern subject matter within the scope
of the police power; that the means of regulation adopted must bear a
relationship to the desired end; and that fundamental rights must not be
abridged.4 Whether specific legislation conforms to these tests is largely
dependent on the character of the right allegedly abridged, 5 and the underlying factual data of which a court will take judicial notice. 6 However, in
no case will a court purport to act as a legislative body, reviewing the wisdom of the legislation or deciding whether the regulatory means adopted are
the best conceivable under the circumstances.7 But all of these criteria, being
in the nature of legal conclusions, are only slightly more informative as
guides to validity than the language of the amendment itself. Delineation
of the boundaries of due process as a limitation on the police power has
been accomplished through the process of judicial inclusion and exclusion

1 The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Douglas. Justice Frankfurter
dissented in an opinion in which Justices Harlan and Whittaker joined. Justice Burton
dissented without opinion.
2 District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138 (1909).
s E.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934).
¼ Brown, "Due Process, Police Power and The Supreme Court," 40 HARV. L. REv.
943 (1927).
5 Discussing the required relationship between the means and end the Court said,
" . • . it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which determines what
standard governs the choice." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 at 530 (1945).
6 For example, see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), where the Court
recognized that vaccination afforded protection against smallpox; Bikle, "Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action,"
38 HAR.v. L. REv. 6 (1924).
7 Mcl..ean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909).
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as applied to specific cases.8 As a result of this process the Supreme Court,
recognizing the need for government to enact measures for the social
betterment, has consistently held that it is not a violation of due process
for a state to impose criminal liability for acts or omissions unaccompanied
by criminal intent or guilty knowledge.9 The opinion of the majority in
the principal case recognizes and adds its approval to this line of precedent
as applied to statutes imposing criminal penalties for acts, or for omissions
where a person is alerted to the requirement of action by the circumstances,
but refuses to apply the rule to an omission under conditions that do not
warn of a duty to act.10 As pointed out by the dissenting opinion of Justice
Frankfurter, the reason for this distinction does not seem to arise out of
comparison of concepts of fairness, hardship, and justice as applied to the
two situations.11 Similarly, there does not seem to be any reason for the
distinction drawn by the majority between regulation of an activity and
the regulation of a status acquired in consequence of an activity, so far as
the power to enact a statute which excludes the element of scienter from
proof of its violation is concemed.12 There is one factor, however, implicit
in the majority opinion, which serves to distinguish the principal case. The
individual hardship and injustice which may be the result of conviction
without regard to knowledge and intent has been justified under the due
process requirement by a recognition of the overriding social interest in
the increased compliance with criminal laws secured by a facilitated enforcement process.18 That justification shrinks in stature when applied to
an ordinance, the ultimate purpose of which is not to secure compliance
with its provisions, but instead to bring about certain indirect effects. An
analysis of the application of criminal registration ordinances suggests that
their main purpose is not to obtain information concerning the activities
and location of ex-criminals. It is rather to ease the law enforcement process
by the creation of a statutory duty which will usually be neglected because
of ignorance of its existence, thus enabling the police to arrest and detain

s Brown, "Due Process, Police Power and The Supreme Court," 40 HARv. L. REv.
943 (1927).
9 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); Chicago, B. &: Q. R. Co. v. United States,
220 U.S. 559 (19ll); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
10 T:he absence of precedent for this ·holding is suggested iby the fact that the majority
cited in support of its opinion three decisions concerned with notice as a requirement
of procedural due process in civil litigation. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956); Walk.er v. Hutchinson
City, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
11 But see Hughes, "Criminal Omissions," 67 YALE L.J. 590 at 619 (1958), where the
author interprets the principal case as confined to omissions " ••• where the duty to act
arises only because of a person's presence in a certain locality.''
12 The majority opinion refers approvingly -to registration statutes, which are akin
to licensing statutes in that they purport to regulate an activity.
18 United States v. Balint, note 9 supra.
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persons for investigation with regard to other unrelated criminal activity.14
This is, in effect, an attempt to accomplish indirectly what could not be
done directly.15 Abusive and discriminatory practices have in fact marked
the history of the application of this ordinance and of similar ordinances
in other cities.16 While these practices in themselves would not warrant
invalidation of the ordinance, they do provide added reason for limiting
its operation to the achievement of its avowed purpose of obtaining information about ex-criminals-a probable result of this decision.17 Because of the
narrow terms in which it is formulated, the decision is not calculated to
weaken the established doctrine that ignorance of the law will not insulate
against punishment for its violation.18
David C. Berg

14 See

103 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 60 (1954); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).

15 For more direct attempts which were declared invalid under either the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or of similar provisions of state constitutions,
see Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (gangster statute which purported to
punish any person not engaged in a lawful occupation who had been convicted of
disorderly conduct three times or of any crime in New Jersey or any other state, and
who was known to be a member of a gang composed of two or more persons); People
v. Licavoli, 264 Mich. 643, 250 N.W. 520 (1933) (proof of recent reputation for engaging
in illegal occupation or business was deemed prima fade evidence of being engaged in
illegal occupation or business); People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934)
(persons reputed to be habitual violators of the criminal laws were deemed to be
vagabonds, punishable as such).
16 See 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 60 (1954). For a recent example see 18 THE REPORTER,
p. 25:2, March 6, 1958.
17 The majority opinion indicates that conviction for violation of the ordinance
would ibe valid if the accused had knowledge of its existence, or if sufficient facts were
in evidence to establish probable knowledge. Thus law enforcement officials who wish
to enforce the statute for informational purposes will be able to do so, provided they
adequately publicize the registration ordinance so as to give felons notice of the statutory
duty.
18 This point was noted by the dissent. Principal case at 232.

